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ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN CHOICES OF HIGH-TECH STARTUPS – 
HOW MIDDLE MANAGEMENT DRIVES INNOVATION PERFORMANCE 
 
Research summary 
Innovative products and services are the inspiration for many startups. However, founders find 
that the management of existing operations competes with the attention that they can devote to 
innovation. We investigate whether and how establishing a middle management level frees up 
attention for innovation when firms are newly started. We argue that middle management is posi-
tively related to introducing product innovations and that the effect is stronger when founders 
have larger stocks of pre-existing knowledge and when the startup’s industry provides more in-
novation opportunities. These hypotheses are supported by an analysis of 2,431 German high-
tech startups founded between 2005 and 2012. 
Managerial summary 
Most high-tech entrepreneurs acknowledge that an overload of managerial tasks keeps them from 
advancing innovation in their startups. However, they are often times reluctant to introduce mid-
dle management because of a fear that the resulting bureaucratization will stifle innovation. Our 
study shows that these fears are not justified. Instead, we find for 2,431 high-tech startups in 
Germany that startups with middle managers are significantly more innovative than those with-
out. While middle managers might be a roadblock for innovation in large firms, startups benefit 
from having them. Founders are the central decision makers in startups and can easily be over-
burdened with management tasks. Middle managers can alleviate parts of this workload and al-




“We noticed that we had to do something to reclaim capacities for developing the firm 
and the product. I’m the driver of the firm and I push new product ideas. That’s what I 
find fun. My motivation and my strength are product development.” 
Interview quote by the founder of an IT startup on how the creation of middle man-
agement helped innovation in his startup 
 
Launching innovative products onto the market is a central element in the strategies of most 
startups in high-technology sectors (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003; Block et al., 2016). Having 
discovered an entrepreneurial opportunity, many startups find themselves in a race to realize that 
opportunity by introducing new products ahead of competitors or before their funding runs out 
(Venkataraman, 1997; Shane, 2000). During this critical startup phase in a firm’s organizational 
lifecycle, entrepreneurs are typically the primary decision makers which challenges them to ded-
icate sufficient attention to innovation to be successful (Gifford, 1992; Zahra et al., 2009). By 
their very definition, innovation activities are novel and uncertain; they involve decisions about 
which technological path to choose and predictions about market conditions (Amit et al., 1990). 
Attention allocation is challenging since attention is a scarce resource and founders face 
tradeoffs when allocating attention to other tasks (Simon, 1948; Ocasio, 1997). In that regard, 
founders face opportunity costs on whether to allocate attention to the improvement of current 
operations or to innovation (Gifford, 1992). Hence, founders are likely to consider organizational 
design choices, which alleviate some of their attention constraints during the startup phase. 
However, extant literature has focused much more on later stages in the organizational lifecycle 
in which startups have already generated substantial sales (Daily & Dalton, 1992), enter stable 
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environments (Gedajlovic et al., 2004) or target initial public offerings (IPOs) (Wu & Hsu, 
2018). 
In this study, we investigate whether startups can improve the likelihood of successful inno-
vation by altering their organizational design to alleviate attention allocation tradeoffs. More 
specifically, we investigate the role of middle management, i.e., the delegation of decision mak-
ing authority, for startup innovation. A startup’s middle management may allow for better man-
agement of competing demands for attention and for better information processing related to 
innovation (e.g., Simon, 1948; Gifford, 1992). Although prior literature highlights how demand-
ing and error prone innovation decisions are for the management of established firms (Koput, 
1997; Katila, 2002), the effect of middle management on innovation in startups has not been 
documented in the theoretical and empirical literature. In short, this study focusses on the re-
search question: Do startups with middle management have a higher likelihood for successful 
innovation than startups without? 
Our theoretical reasoning revolves around the issue of how middle management can help en-
trepreneurs, oftentimes the founder or founding team of a startup, to dedicate attention to innova-
tion vis-à-vis other tasks. We draw theoretical mechanisms from the literature on how middle 
managers increase a startup’s information processing capacity, as well as free up the attention of 
founders (Colombo & Grilli, 2013), and then integrate the mechanisms into a model of firm in-
novation that comprises search, selection, and implementation of new information, knowledge, 
and ideas (Koput, 1997). We reason that middle management allows founders to devote compar-
atively more attention to innovation, making startups more likely to introduce product innova-
tions. Middle management can immediately take over responsibilities for managing current oper-
ations, allowing founders to devote more entrepreneurial attention to innovation. Moreover, mid-
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dle management provides information about current operations, permitting founders to better 
prioritize how to allocate attention. We rely on a contingency analysis that tests two situations in 
which the startup is particularly likely to benefit from founder attention to innovation, i.e., we 
investigate the size of the founder’s existing knowledge base and the innovation opportunities 
available in the startup’s industry.  
We test our theoretical reasoning using a unique sample of more than 5,600 firm-year obser-
vations of 2,431 high-tech startups founded in Germany between 2005 and 2012. The infor-
mation on these firms stems from linked employer-employee data that merges firm data from a 
panel survey with official registry data on the employees who work in these firms. Our reasoning 
is informed by a series of semi-structured interviews with startup founders and middle managers 
in startups that help us better understand the role and responsibilities of middle managers in such 
contexts.
1
 Our empirical study confirms that startups with middle management increase their 
likelihood to introduce product innovation and that this effect is stronger when founders have 
larger stocks of pre-existing knowledge and the startup industry provides comparatively more 
opportunities for innovation.  
We advance existing literature in two important ways. First, we know comparatively little 
about how these early-stage changes in organizational design affect startups’ innovation perfor-
mance, arguably a core strategic goal of most high-tech startups. Our theoretical model introduc-
es information processing and monitoring mechanisms from existing middle management litera-
ture into a model of founder attention allocation for innovation, providing a basis for future theo-
rizing. This allows us to describe changes in the relationship between founders and “rank and 
                                                 
1
 Specifically, we conduct five interviews with startup founders and middle managers from different startups. The 
interviews lasted about one hour each and were conducted in an open way, including only few defined questions on 
the role of founders and middle managers, and how middle management frees up attention. 
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file” employees when middle management affects the way in which information from these em-
ployees, such as requests or feedback on new materials or equipment from supplies or customers, 
becomes available to founders. What is more, we challenge existing literature, which investigates 
innovation outcomes of high-tech startups where founders have been replaced by professional 
management, by focusing on organizational design changes such as the introduction of middle 
management that occur before startups reach a threshold stage that requires further professionali-
zation. These early stages of high-tech startups are particularly salient for research and practice 
since many startups run out of funding before they can create an innovative product. 
Second, an emerging stream of entrepreneurship literature emphasizes how both founder ex-
perience and external opportunity shape startup success (e.g., Dencker & Gruber, 2015). For in-
novation outcomes, we show that these theoretical models are incomplete in the sense that they 
underestimate the effect of the organizational design of startups. Our model takes into account 
how founders face tradeoffs for devoting sufficient attention to innovation. The contingency ap-
proach in our theory development suggests that middle management has particularly strong ef-
fects on startup innovation when founders are well prepared to innovate, i.e., have pre-existing 
knowledge stocks and industry environments in which the search for innovation pays off since 
many opportunities exist. These insights provide further room for theorizing about the direction 
of the reallocation of founder attention following the introduction of middle management, since 
the existing model comparing allocation to innovation or current operations appears to be too 
coarse (Gifford, 1992). 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Our theoretical reasoning lays out how the presence of middle management affects a startup’s 
likelihood for introducing innovations in general, as well as how this general relationship is af-
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fected by two moderating factors. We start by outlining a model of firm innovation and highlight 
the role of attention allocation in the startup phase in which the founders are the key decision 
makers. We use this model to develop hypotheses on how middle management can help founders 
to allocate attention to innovation processes. In accordance with previous studies, we refer to the 
founders as the startup’s highest management level that makes strategic decisions (e.g., Dencker 
& Gruber, 2015), given that very few startups hire professional top managers early in their life 
cycle. Our terminology assumes that the hierarchical level below the founders (i.e., top manage-
ment) is the middle management. 
The role of entrepreneurial attention for the innovation process 
The focus of our theorizing is on the startup phase of new ventures. The startup phase is the ini-
tial stage of a firm’s organizational lifecycle (Daily & Dalton, 1992). During this stage, startups 
rely typically on their founders for strategic decision-making (Nelson, 2003), creativity and in-
novativeness (Zahra et al., 2009). Founders are uniquely positioned as chief decision makers for 
the dynamically changing environment of the startup phase since they combine the authority and 
legitimacy for centralized decision making as a startup’s dominant shareholder (Gedajlovic et al., 
2004). Literature suggests that these founder-manager advantages extend far into a startup’s 
lifecycle until firms reach significant size thresholds (Daily and Dalton (1992), Walters et al., 
2010).  
Entrepreneurship in high-technology sectors is distinct from other industries in the sense that 
the generation of innovations is typically the defining purpose of such startups (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2003). Entrepreneurs must discover and identify innovation opportunities where new 
technologies could be used (e.g., Venkataraman, 1997; Shane, 2000; Dencker & Gruber, 2015). 
While innovation outcomes depend on many factors such as the availability of financial re-
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sources and skilled employees (Ahuja et al., 2008), management attention to innovation has been 
identified as particularly salient since most organizations tend towards stability and routine at the 
expense of innovation activities (Van de Ven, 1986).  
Koput (1997) describes a formal model for an innovation process as a system in which two 
significantly different components interact. The first component involves the search for infor-
mation, knowledge, and ideas that benefits from experimentation and unpredictability. The sec-
ond component of the innovation process involves implementation, where innovation outcomes 
are efficiently and reliably produced. A screening function connects search with implementation, 
i.e., new ideas that may lead to innovations have to be evaluated and decisions about which ones 
to implement (and how) have to be made (Koput, 1997). Firms will be more innovative if they 
can allocate sufficient attention to decision making on search, screening, and implementation. 
Attention allocation is a challenge for firms since (a) management attention is a limited re-
source for firms and managers face tradeoffs when allocating attention to other tasks (Ocasio, 
1997; Kaplan, 2011) and since (b) search, screening, and implementation are not sequential pro-
cesses but rather a dynamic, interconnected system with feedback loops. In sum, the model sug-
gests that attention is key to regulate the flow of ideas and their implementation through innova-
tion. Dahlander et al. (2016) highlight the importance of individual-level decision making on 
attention allocation and its effect on innovation outcomes. In this sense, attention can be defined 
as the cognitive processes by which individuals notice, interpret, and focus efforts, as well as the 
time spent on collecting information and knowledge (Kaplan, 2011; Li et al., 2013). The atten-
tion allocation of top management in particular determines innovation success.  
While established firms can distribute attention for innovation among professional manag-
ers, decision making in the startup phase is typically dominated by the founders, whose decisions 
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have vital influence on the firm (Wasserman, 2012). Founders have been found to be the central 
actors in the innovation process of startups, especially as a source of creativity (Marvel & 
Lumpkin, 2007; Ahlin et al., 2014). Given that founders are typically responsible for all high-
level decision making in startups, opportunity costs for entrepreneurial attention are likely to 
emerge (Gifford, 1992; Acs & Gifford, 1996). The innovation outcomes of startups will be nega-
tively affected if founders cannot accurately and sufficiently identify new ideas or cannot devote 
the attention intensity necessary to evaluate them thoroughly (Li et al., 2013).  
Middle management and its effect on entrepreneurial attention for innovation 
The term middle management originates from the perspective that firms consist of at least two 
levels, i.e., top level decision makers, such as founders, and line workers (Rajan & Wulf, 2003), 
even though startups oftentimes only consist of the founders for a prolonged period. The intro-
duction of a hierarchical level in between, i.e., middle management, constitutes a major change 
in organizational design (Colombo & Grilli, 2013). Middle managers are managerial or adminis-
trative specialists with delegated decision rights (Baron et al., 1999). They can reduce the ambi-
guity about the organization of work in a firm, improving coordination and efficiency (Sine et 
al., 2006).  
Since all individuals are naturally limited in their capacity to acquire, store, process, and 
transmit information (Simon, 1948), the establishment of a middle-management level can im-
prove the information processing capacity of startups (Colombo & Grilli, 2013). The middle 
management of an organization allows it to handle a given amount of information more efficient-
ly by enabling parallel information processing in which middle managers share information pro-
cessing tasks with top management (Radner, 1993). Moreover, the establishment of a middle 
management level allows firms to use existing information processing capacities more efficiently 
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by enabling hierarchical decision making (Garicano, 2000). Middle managers turn to top man-
agement only if their knowledge is insufficient to deal with a particular problem. In that sense, 
middle management can allow an organization to predict more accurately when problems or pro-
jects have reached a scope that benefit from organization-wide solutions that are most effectively 
addressed by top managers (Harris & Raviv, 2002). 
We conjecture that the improvement in a startup’s information processing capacity derived 
from introducing middle managers alleviates the limitations on entrepreneurial attention that 
founders can allocate to current operations or innovation. Middle managers can, at least partly, 
take over the management of existing products and operations (Gifford, 1992). This allows 
founders to devote comparatively more attention to  searching, screening, and implementing new 
knowledge and ideas to exploit innovation opportunities (Koput, 1997). Consistently, a member 
of the founding team of a software startup tells us: 
“We decided to have middle management when we had three employees. At this point, 
I realized that I could no longer handle the further development of the product and, at 
the same time, be responsible for the financials, sales, personnel management and ac-
counting.” 
Furthermore, middle management also affects the way in which information from “rank and file” 
employees, such as requests or feedback on new materials or equipment from suppliers or cus-
tomers, becomes available to founders. Delegation to middle management makes more infor-
mation on the status of current operations available to the founders, in turn reducing the likeli-
hood that the founders will waste time evaluating current operations without potential for im-
provement (Gifford, 1992). Founders may even delegate decision making responsibility to mid-
dle managers to improve current operations, allowing them to continue searching, screening, and 
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implementing new projects (Gifford, 1992). In other words, middle management decreases the 
founders’ opportunity costs of not attending to innovation. In an interview, the middle manager 
of a software startup describes this mechanism in his startup:  
“Our founders meet with the middle managers every week to receive updates and to 
discuss the status of current projects. That definitely helps the founders to concentrate 
on new projects, new features, and solutions they would like to launch on the market.”  
In conclusion, we suggest that a startup’s middle management is likely to improve its ability to 
innovate. Our first hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 1: Startups with middle management are more likely to introduce product 
innovations. 
Moderating effects from opportunity costs for entrepreneurial attention to innovation 
The logic underlying hypothesis 1 is not directly testable since the shift of founder attention is 
not immediately observable. We rely instead on a contingency analysis that tests two situations 
in which the startup is particularly likely to benefit from founder attention to innovation and de-
velop moderator hypotheses based on the pre-existing knowledge of founders and the opportuni-
ties for knowledge search in a startup’s industry. 
We focus first on the founders’ prior technological knowledge base and argue that the larger 
the founders’ knowledge base the greater are opportunity costs for the startup if founders cannot 
dedicate entrepreneurial attention to innovation. Extant literature frequently highlights that 
startups – through their founders – are differentially endowed with resources upon market entry, 
including prior technological knowledge, invested capital, or managerial, entrepreneurial, and 
industry experience (e.g., Shane, 2000; Dencker & Gruber, 2015).  
Prior knowledge has frequently been characterized as a central determinant of a firm’s abil-
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ity to innovate (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Dedicating attention de-
creases the likelihood of errors and false starts when using the same set of knowledge repeatedly, 
causing the search to become more reliable (Levinthal & March, 1993). Moreover, the startup’s 
search becomes more predictable if founders with prior knowledge have a better understanding 
of the requirements that need to be met for successful innovation (Li et al., 2013). At the same 
time, prior knowledge enables founders to better screen and evaluate new knowledge and re-
combinations of knowledge since prior knowledge is connected to the founders’ absorptive ca-
pacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In an interview, the middle manager in charge of investor 
relations for a pharmaceutical startup describes this mechanism in relation to the founder of her 
startup:  
“Our founder is a scientist who had the initial patent and is still an active researcher 
for the company. Sometimes he has a hard time seeing what direction the firm is grow-
ing in. Then again, he understands that he has a scientific mindset, not a business 
school one.”  
As a result, startups are more innovative if founders with large stocks of existing knowledge can 
allocate sufficient attention to decision making on search, screening, and implementation. In this 
situation, middle management is most effective because it frees up the entrepreneurial attention 
of these founders. In sum, our second hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 2: Startups with middle management are more likely to introduce product 
innovations, and this likelihood increases with the size of the founders’ existing 
knowledge base. 
The second moderating effect that we focus on is the innovation opportunities in a startup’s in-
dustry, suggesting that, as for the previous hypothesis, larger innovation opportunities increase 
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the startups opportunity costs if founders cannot dedicate attention to innovation.  
Gifford (1992) points out that the positive effect of founder attention on startup innovation is 
not limited to sources within the firm. The external environment is an important determinant for 
the search stages of the innovation processes (Koput, 1997). It determines the quality and quanti-
ty of useful knowledge and information that can enter a startup’s innovation process. Founders 
are an important interface for external knowledge (Gifford, 1992). 
The idea that innovation opportunities are largely determined by the industry in which a firm 
operates has been foundational to innovation research (e.g., Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 2008; 
Köhler et al., 2012). Industries differ significantly in the extent to which they can provide such 
opportunities to firms, depending, for example, on the pace of technology development, the 
emergence of new technologies, and the specific patterns of innovation in an industry (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982).  
Industries in which innovation opportunities are plentiful encourage extensive investments 
in searches, which, in turn, require individual firms to search more actively to access critical 
knowledge sources (Klevorick et al., 1995). This implies that industries with high innovation 
opportunities require a higher degree of attention from the founders to search for new knowledge 
effectively. The more entrepreneurial attention founders can make available for searching in high 
opportunity industries, the higher the likely rewards will be. In an interview, the founder of a 
high-tech startup describes the kind of attention he needs to devote to innovation opportunities in 
his industry:  
“A major source of innovative ideas is customers. Then, I always keep myself in-
formed about competitors. I read up on what’s new on the market. I track new techno-
logical developments and business models. It’s also important for me to stay on top of 
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political developments on solar power payment schemes all over the globe.”  
Middle management that frees up entrepreneurial attention of this kind can therefore be expected 
to facilitate innovation outcomes, in particular for startups in industries with many innovation 
opportunities. Our third hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 3: Startups with middle management are more likely to introduce product 
innovations, and this likelihood increases with the innovation opportunities in the 
startup’s industry. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
To test our hypotheses, we construct a dedicated dataset combining multiple data sources that is 
based on a linked employer-employee panel dataset that matches firm-level data from the 
KfW/ZEW Startup Panel, with the official employment statistics provided by the German Feder-
al Employment Agency. The KfW/ZEW Startup Panel is a survey of German startups of 2005-
2012 cohorts. It was established in 2008 as a joint project of the KfW Bankengruppe (Germany’s 
largest state-owned promotional bank), the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), and 
Creditreform (Germany’s largest credit rating agency). The KfW/ZEW Startup Panel is a strati-
fied random sample of legally independent new ventures drawn from the Mannheim Enterprise 
Panel, which contains basic startup information (for a detailed description, see Bersch et al., 
2014). Stratification is controlled for by including dummy variables for the stratification cells in 
all regressions. When included in the sample, firms cannot be older than three years, subsidiaries 
or ventures that resulted from merger activities are excluded (for a detailed description, see 
Fryges et al., 2010). 
Startups that have participated in the survey once are subsequently followed for up to seven 
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successive years. Data are collected using computer-assisted telephone interviews. In the present 
study, the survey data provide information about the founders’ characteristics (i.e., educational 
background and managerial and entrepreneurial leadership experience) and venture characteris-
tics (including innovation and R&D activities). 
We match the firm level information with employee level information from official Federal 
Employment Agency employment statistics. The employment statistics contain person-specific 
registry data on all employees subject to social security contributions in Germany.
2
 This dataset 
is a rich source of employee records, allowing, most importantly, the identification of middle 
managers based on occupation codes (see variable description below). Moreover, the employ-
ment statistics also provide details on additional employee characteristics for the purpose of our 
study. 
As there is no common identifier in the two datasets, we match startups from the KfW/ZEW 
Startup Panel by means of a text search algorithm using startup names and addresses. Described 
in detail in Czarnitzki et al. (2015), the text search algorithm has proven to deliver very reliable 
results in various settings. We were able to match about 90% of the startups from the KfW/ZEW 
Startup Panel that self-reported having employees subject to social security contributions (during 
a telephone interview) with one or more establishments from the official employment statistics. 
Firms that self-reported having employees subject to social security contributions, but which 
could not be found in the official employment statistics, were removed from the sample.  
We are able to draw on 5,672 observations from 2,431 startups that operate in knowledge-
                                                 
2
 In addition to regular full-time and part-time employees, this includes apprentices, interns, and marginally em-
ployed personnel. All notifications on employment and unemployment spells of an individual can be linked with the 
aid of a unique person-specific identifier, making it possible to obtain the complete employment history of each 
employee. A further identifier makes it possible to match the employees to establishments.  
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intensive industries, have at least one owner who is active in managing the firm, and have at least 
one paid employee in the panel dataset that we use for estimations.
3
 4,785 of these firm-year ob-




Our hypotheses predict the likelihood with which startups introduce product innovations. Ac-
cordingly, we create a dummy variable for the introduction of a new product in a given year.
4
 
The respective question in the questionnaire explicitly includes the introduction of new services 
(as the “products” of service firms). New products (or services) can have various degrees of nov-
elty. The formulation of the question about innovation outcomes follows the OECD Oslo Manual 
on how to measure innovation (OECD, 2005) and is widely applied in the European “Communi-
ty Innovation Surveys”. Accordingly, we identify a startup as having a product innovation when 
it indicates that it had a new product (or service) that is new to the market, not just new to the 
startup itself. We assess the robustness of our results by using all new-to-the-firm innovations 
and total factor productivity as alternative outcome measures.  
Explanatory variables 
Our main variables of interest on the right-hand side of our estimation equation are whether or 
not a firm employs at least one employee who is appointed with delegated decision-making au-
thority (middle manager), the size of the existing knowledge stock of the founder and the extent 
                                                 
3
 Knowledge-intensive industries include cutting-edge and high-technology manufacturing, technology-intensive 
services, software supply and consultancy, and skill-intensive services in line with Fryges et al. (2010).  
4
 The information on innovation in the data is only available in a yes/no format. It is not possible to differentiate 
firms with more than one innovation. Since the introduction of a new-to-the-market innovation is a rather rare event 
for a typical startup, a binary indicator for innovation outcomes should provide an adequate picture, however. 
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of innovation opportunities in a startup’s industry. 
We construct our binary indicator for the presence of a middle manager from occupation 
codes available in the employment statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency. In the 
individual level data, occupations are coded using the five-digit occupation code KldB2010 (the 
German adaption of ISCO-08, devised by the Federal Employment Agency). While the first 
three digits describe the particular functional specialization of an occupation, individuals in oc-
cupations with supervisory or executive competences are identified by a “9” as the fourth digit of 
the five-digit KldB2010 occupation code. We classify individuals with such supervisory or exec-
utive competences as middle managers. We use a binary indictor, since almost 80% of the 
startups with middle management have only a single middle manager. 
In post-hoc analyses, we differentiate between middle managers in technical occupations 
and middle managers in administrative occupations.
5
 Since our definition of middle management 
would also include professional managers that were hired to replace founders, we restrict our 
sample to firm-year observations for which there is at least one owner active in managing the 
firm. We argue that in such situations the owner-manager is usually the ultimate decision maker 
in the firm. We test this definition in two robustness checks. First, we further restrict our sample 
to firm-year observations before the first change (if any) in the team of owner-managers occurs, 
so that the owner-managers are necessarily founders of the company. This eliminates the risk 
that we would classify a professional CEO, who also becomes (co-)owner of a business and re-
places the founders as ultimate decision makers, as “middle manager”. In a second robustness 
check, we exclude all middle managers whose occupation codes refer to CEO positions. This 
                                                 
5
 We use a classification of technical jobs developed by the German Federal Employment Agency and a similar, 
adapted classification for administrative jobs for the purpose of the robustness check. 
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might be overly restrictive, because it excludes managers who in fact take middle positions be-
tween founders and rank-and-file employees. 
We approximate the founders’ existing knowledge base by the number of patents the found-
ers of a startup held prior to the registration of the firm. This information is retrieved from the 
survey data of the KfW/ZEW Startup Panel.  
We measure the innovation opportunities in the startup’s industry by the average number of 
different innovation sources that firms in the same two-digit NACE industry use in the innova-
tion process. The measure follows the idea that external sources of innovation provide 
knowledge and impulses that firms can benefit from in their innovation activities (Laursen & 
Salter, 2006). We derive this information from Mannheim Innovation Panel firm level data, the 
German contribution to the harmonized European “Community Innovation Survey”. It covers ten 
different information sources, such as customers, suppliers, competitors, and universities. We 
sum up the number of different innovation sources that firms have used to yield a measure of 
breadth. Subsequently, we calculate the average breadth in each two-digit NACE industry.
6
 
We control for a number of factors that have frequently been shown to be associated with 
the likelihood to innovate (Ahuja et al., 2008). Table A.1 in the online appendix provides details 
on the construction of all variables. We control for the number of founders and for R&D in par-
ticular, by including R&D expenditures (scaled by startup sales). In addition, we control for the 
size of the startup measured by the number of dependent employees (including middle manag-
ers). We account for differences in human capital quality using a dummy variable if at least one 
of the founders had a tertiary education as well as the share of employees with tertiary education. 
                                                 
6
 To obtain a meaningful number of observations for each two-digit NACE industry, we pool data from the Mann-
heim Innovation Panel waves of 2005 and 2009 for the first half of our observation period (2007-2009) and data 
from the waves of 2013 and 2017 for the second half of our observation period (2010-2012) 
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We use a dummy variable for the founders’ tertiary education since the information is only 
available in the dataset as yes/no information. Employees’ levels of education can be calculated 
as shares from the German Federal Employment Agency registry data. As a result, we decided to 
use the more precise information available for employees. 
Moreover, founder experience has been found to impact startup performance (Colombo et 
al., 2004; Colombo & Grilli, 2005). We capture these effects with two dummy variables indicat-
ing whether the founder had managerial or entrepreneurial experience as well as the number of 
years of industry experience of the founder. Moreover, some founders have been found to be 
reluctant to take on management tasks (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). Hence, we include a dummy 
variable for whether at least one of the founders has an educational background in business ad-
ministration (or economics) and the share of employees in administrative occupations (excluding 
middle managers) at the time of firm foundation. 
Taking into consideration structural differences among startups, we control for the startup’s 
age and whether it is incorporated (limited liability). In addition, following Dencker and Gruber 
(2015), we include a measure of the riskiness of a startup’s business opportunity since it might 
affect both the organizational design choices and innovation potential. We further add industry 
dummies on the three-digit NACE level, as well as year dummies to all specifications.  
Estimation approach and identification 
Since our dependent variable is binary, we choose probit estimates with standard errors robust to 
clustering at the startup level as our main estimation method. In our analyses, we estimate a se-
ries of interaction effects. The interpretation of interaction effects in nonlinear models, such as 
probit or logit models, is not straightforward (Ai & Norton, 2003; Greene, 2010). Therefore, we 
initially calculate the correct marginal effects manually for the interaction terms using the con-
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trast operator of Stata’s “margins” command. In addition, we double check all results with linear 
probability models as a robustness check and do not find any qualitative differences.  
Endogeneity is a potential issue in our empirical setting. A first source of endogeneity might 
stem from simultaneity/omitted variable bias. It seems plausible to assume that startups of higher 
quality might simultaneously have a higher probability of doing both, hiring a middle manager 
and introducing an innovation. If we cannot control for startup quality adequately, we might spu-
riously attribute changes in innovation propensity to the introduction of middle management. We 
address this problem using a two-step strategy. First, we pre-balance our sample over a large 
number of indicators for firm quality with respect to firm-year observations with middle man-
agement and those without. Second, we control for factors that might determine the firms’ inno-
vation success directly in all estimated models.  
We apply entropy balancing to implement the pre-balancing empirically. Entropy balancing 
achieves balance over specified moments of selected covariates by deriving sample weights. The 
retrieved weights are then used in subsequent weighted estimations (Hainmueller, 2011; 
Hainmueller & Xu, 2013). Intuitively, this can be understood as the creation of a synthetic con-
trol group, where the observations in the control group are reweighted so that their specified 
sample moments mimic those of the treatment group as closely as possible (cf. Abadie et al., 
2010). In contrast to other related methods, for instance propensity score matching, entropy bal-
ancing induces covariate balance directly, and not as the result of a propensity score matching 
procedure (which requires iterated re-specifications of the propensity score estimation to achieve 
covariate balance). Entropy balancing has been applied for sample balancing in several recent 
studies (e.g., Bansak et al., 2016; Malesky & Taussig, 2017; Satyanath et al., 2017).  
Our choice of indicators for startup quality in the balancing exercise follows the results of 
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Colombo and Grilli (2013), who analyze the antecedents of the emergence of a middle manage-
ment layer in Italian high-tech startups. Moreover, we balance on additional factors that signifi-
cantly predict the existence of a middle management in our data to ensure a balanced regression 
sample. We balance on the number of employees of the startup, whether the firm is incorporated 
with limited liability, firm age, the riskiness of a startup’s business opportunity, whether the firm 
reported having equity investors in the first interview, the number of patents a firm founder held 
at the time of firm foundation, the R&D intensity of the startup, a dummy variables for whether 
at least one founder has an education in business administration/economics, the share of employ-
ees with administrative occupations at the time of foundation, measures for founder human capi-
tal (whether the founder has a tertiary education, whether the founder had started a firm before, 
and whether the founder has experience as a manager in dependent employment), the employees’ 
human capital (the share of employees with tertiary education), and the stratification industries of 
the KfW/ZEW Startup Panel.
7
  
As expected, the data show that startups with middle management clearly outperform those 
without middle management with respect to nearly all firm quality indicators. After balancing, 
though, original differences are leveled entirely (see Table A.2 in the online appendix for re-
sults). As a robustness check, we estimate fixed effects regressions that allow us to control for 
unobserved time-constant heterogeneity between startups.  
A second, closely related, source of endogeneity might arise from direct reverse causality 
when firms appoint a middle manager in response to the introduction of a market novelty. We 
double check our results by using lagged values of middle management and other innovation 
inputs as explanatory variables to assess the potential bias caused. To assess the robustness of 
                                                 
7
 For founding teams, we use information on the founder with the highest education/most experience. 
22 
our identification strategy, we re-estimate our main models by an endogenous treatment effects 
model, sometimes also referred to as a binary endogenous-variable model. The intuition behind 
this Heckman-type model is to introduce exogenous variation in the probability to employ a 
middle manager via exclusion restrictions in a (first) selection stage and to estimate unbiased 
effects in the second stage by controlling for the probability of selection (Heckman, 1978). As 
exclusion restrictions in the first stage of the endogenous treatment effects model (selection 
equation), we use two measures that predict the presence of a middle manager but that we regard 
as plausibly exogenous to a startup’s innovation performance: (1) the number of executives in 
firms that filed bankruptcy in the same district and one-digit NACE industry in a given year and 
(2) the propensity that other firms in the sample, which operate in the same one-digit NACE in-
dustry and are in the same size category, have middle management.
8
 The first exclusion re-
striction introduces exogenous variation due to a local supply shock of potential candidates for 
middle management positions. The second exclusion restriction introduces exogenous variation 
in the firms’ demand for middle managers. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics, pairwise correlations and variance inflation factors 
(VIFs). The descriptive statistics show that 15% of startups in our sample report product innova-
tions, which gives some indication that achieving innovation success is challenging for the aver-
age high-tech startup. On average, startups are 3.04 years old, have 1.69 founders, and employ 
                                                 
8
 The necessity to introduce a hierarchical structure depends crucially on industry and firm size (Rajan & Zingales, 
2001). However, the probability that other firms employ a middle manager should not directly influence a focal 
firm’s probability to launch an innovation. We define six size categories to achieve an as uniform as possible distri-
bution of observations over size categories: (1) 1 employee, (2) 2 employees, (3) 3 or 4 employees, (4) 5 to 7 em-
ployees, (5) 8 to 14 employees, and (6) more than 14 employees. 
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4.79 employees. They spend 12% of sales on R&D. Founders hold, on average, 0.4 patents when 
creating the startup, albeit with a large standard deviation. As an indicator of innovation oppor-
tunities, firms in the startup’s industry use, on average, 4.87 different innovation sources (with a 
2.03 to 7.37 range).  
------ Table 1 about here ------ 
------ Table 2 about here ------ 
Most of the startups operate in service sectors, especially technology-intensive services (41%). 
31 percent of the startups operate in high-tech manufacturing sectors, which typically have high-
er entry barriers, for example, due to necessary fixed capital investments. The riskiness of the 
business opportunities of startups in our sample is at an intermediate level at 315.51 on a scale 
between 100 and 600. Most startups are incorporated as limited liability companies (65%) but 
few have equity investors from the start (4%). Moreover, 11% of startups in our sample have 
middle management. Hence, a large number of startups makes this organizational design choice, 
but the majority of startups does not. This indicates that the introduction of middle management 
has the potential to be a strategic decision differentiating startups from their peers. 
None of the correlations between the explanatory variables reach levels that indicate colline-
arity problems. This is supported by the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) between the main ex-
planatory variables, which has an average value of 1.15 and a maximum value of 1.30. The VIF 
is far below the usually applied critical level of 10 (Belsley et al., 1980). 
Exploratory study on the determinants of the introduction of middle management 
We explore the determinants for the introduction of middle management in a startup further by 
estimating a probit model for the presence of this organizational level. Table 3 shows the estima-
tion results as model A.  
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------ Table 3 about here ------ 
Most importantly, startup size (number of employees) is positively and significantly related to 
the likelihood of startups to employ middle managers. Firm size is likely to increase the infor-
mation volume in startups as well as coordination and management needs. The same factors may 
also explain the significant, positive relationship of the share of employees with tertiary educa-
tion. Presumably, these skilled employees engage in increasingly complex and interconnected 
tasks. The legal form (limited liability) and the investor structure of the startup (equity investors) 
are also positively associated with the likelihood of startups to employ middle management. 
These factors may indicate increasing maturity and professionalization of a focal startup. Inter-
estingly, conditional on other covariates, the age of the startup has a negative, significant (10% 
level of statistical significance) relationship with the employment of middle management. This 
finding suggests that middle management levels are not an automatic byproduct of startups ma-
turing over time but are driven much more by other startup factors, such as firm size. 
In terms of founder characteristics, startups are significantly more likely to introduce middle 
management when founders have managerial experience or an education in business administra-
tion/economics but comparatively few patents. Hence, founders with managerial, instead of 
technological backgrounds, appear to be able to foresee monitoring and coordination needs that 
middle managers can take over. 
In model B of Table 3, we repeat the same probit estimation but apply the weights derived 
from entropy balancing. All variables that significantly predict the presence of a middle man-
agement level in model A no longer have significant effects in the weighted model. As intended, 
the entropy balancing approach eliminates potential selection biases in subsequent estimations by 
achieving balance between startups that introduced middle management and the control group. 
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Results of hypothesis testing 
In line with hypothesis 1, our main multivariate regression estimates from weighted probit mod-
els reveal a significant and positive relationship between middle management and a startup’s 
likelihood to introduce a product innovation (Table 4, column A; see Table A.3 in the online 
appendix, column A for results from the unbalanced/non-weighted model). Employing at least 
one middle manager increases the likelihood to introduce a product innovation by 4.3 percentage 
points. Given that the average propensity to introduce a product innovation in the sample is 15%, 
this effect size stands for a substantial increase. 
------ Table 4 about here ------ 
The marginal effects of the wide range of included control variables show the expected signs. 
Most noteworthy, the R&D intensity has a positive and significant effect, as does the size of the 
existing knowledge stock (patents at time of foundation), the extent of innovation opportunities 
in the industry of the startup (average breadth of innovation sources of firms in the same NACE2 
industry), whether at least one of the founders has a tertiary education, and the share of employ-
ees with tertiary education.  
We apply interaction analyses to test the moderating effects on the relationship between 
middle management and innovation performance that we proposed in hypotheses 2 and 3 (Table 
4, columns B-D). In support of hypothesis 2, we find a positive and significant interaction effect 
between the presence of a middle management level and a startup’s existing knowledge stock. 
Our data also support hypothesis 3, indicating a positive and significant interaction effect be-
tween the availability of innovation opportunities in a startup’s industry and the presence of mid-
dle management.  
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Robustness checks 
We conduct a number of consistency check estimations (for the main robustness checks, see Ta-
ble A.3 in the online appendix, columns B-E; all other estimation tables are available from the 
authors upon request). First, we estimate fixed effects model and models with lagged values for 
middle management and other innovation inputs as explanatory variables, the estimated effect of 
middle management remains significant and quantitatively stable. Second, we apply an endoge-
nous treatment effects model. Both exclusion restrictions have a positive and statistically signifi-
cant impact on the probability to employ a middle manager in the first stage of the estimation 
procedure. Again, the marginal effect of middle management in the second stage of the estima-
tion remains significant and of comparable size. Third, we re-estimate the balanced main model 
using alternative operationalizations of successful innovation as dependent variables. We find 
very similar results qualitatively when we assess the effects of middle management on new-to-
the-firm innovations (instead of new-to-the market innovations) and total factor productivity. To 
estimate effects on total factor productivity, we estimate value-added production functions. 
Overall, we take the stable results of the robustness checks as evidence for the reliability of the 
presented results. 
As additional consistency checks, we examine the robustness of our results with respect to 
our empirical definition of middle management. In a first step, we exclude all observations of 
businesses after the first change (if any) to the initial team of owner-managers is reported. In a 
second step, we exclude all individuals whose occupation classifications refer to CEO positions. 
In both cases, the effect of middle management remains stable, which leads us to the conclusion 
that the reported effects stem from middle managers in firms in which the founders are the ulti-
mate decision makers. 
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Finally, we explore heterogeneity among middle managers by separating them into middle 
managers in technical and administrative occupations to provide a more nuanced understanding 
of their effects on innovation. In line with our theoretical reasoning, the estimation results sug-
gest that the positive significant effect on product innovation emerges for middle managers with 
administrative occupations, while middle managers with technical occupations have no signifi-
cant effects.  
DISCUSSION 
Our research addresses an important gap in the literature on organizational design. While prior 
research has studied adjustments in startups’ organizational design through a process of profes-
sionalization (Greiner, 1972; Hellmann & Puri, 2002), i.e. the replacement of founders through 
professional managers once a startup reaches a certain threshold (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1992; 
Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Walters et al., 2010), relatively little is known about startup profession-
alization that concerns the introduction of an additional hierarchical level during the startup 
phase and when founders are still the ultimate decision makers. Hierarchical differentiation, such 
as middle management, has been characterized as a crucial step for startups to professionalize 
their business (Colombo & Grilli, 2013), yet the implications for innovation, arguably one of the 
most important strategic objectives of high-tech startups, have not been documented in the theo-
retical and empirical literature on professionalization.  
We address this gap theoretically by integrating mechanisms from the opportunity costs for 
founder attention allocation (Gifford, 1992) into an innovation model (Koput, 1997). Within our 
logic, middle management can help founders to direct comparatively more attention to innova-
tion. Consistent with this theoretical reasoning, our empirical analyses provide a number of com-
pelling findings for innovation outcomes in high-tech startups. Based on a unique sample of 
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2,431 startups in Germany, we find that high-tech startups with middle management have a high-
er likelihood of introducing product innovations. We attribute this finding to the fact that the 
establishment of middle management frees up founder attention for innovation by increasing 
information processing and monitoring capacity in the startup (Colombo & Grilli, 2013). Since 
the allocation of founder attention is not directly observable, we rely on a contingency analysis 
of moderating conditions under which additional attention to startup innovation is particularly 
beneficial. Our results emphasize that foregone opportunities for successful innovation signifi-
cantly moderate the middle management effect: Startup innovation benefits most from additional 
founder attention through middle management when (a) founders have pre-existing knowledge 
and when (b) startups operate in industries that provide many opportunities for innovation. 
Our findings advance academic research along two dimensions. First, existing entrepreneur-
ship literature emphasizes how startups mature and professionalize through their organizational 
design choices (Baron et al., 1999; Colombo & Grilli, 2013; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Our theo-
retical model focusses on one particular organizational design choice, i.e., the establishment of a 
middle management layer in a startup, and links it to innovation performance, arguably one of 
the most crucial strategic outcomes for high-tech startups (Block et al., 2016). We delineate this 
design choice from other forms of professionalization such as the replacement of founders by 
professional managers and find that the introduction of middle management can occur much ear-
lier in the organizational lifecycle than thresholds for professionalization found in the literature 
may suggest (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Walters et al., 2010). We integrate mechanisms on infor-
mation processing and monitoring from existing middle management literature into founder at-
tention and innovation models. On the one hand, this provides a basis for future studies to theo-
rize about how middle management affects a startup’s other strategic outcomes, e.g., internation-
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alization. On the other hand, it highlights a weakness in existing literature investigating the inno-
vation outcomes of high-tech startups. Studies ignoring the hierarchical levels are likely to suffer 
from biased results. 
Second, while entrepreneurial experience and opportunity are important mechanisms in en-
trepreneurship research (e.g., Dencker & Gruber, 2015), we know comparatively little about how 
startups set up organizational designs to increase the payoffs of these experiences and opportuni-
ties. Within our theoretical model, founder attention is a scarce resource for startups to achieve 
innovation, and startups can actively influence its availability through hierarchical differentiation 
of decision making using middle management. We demonstrate this insight and its theoretical 
relevance in a contingency analysis that incorporates factors emerging from both founder experi-
ence and industry opportunity. Our theoretical reasoning can serve as a platform for theorizing 
about other organization design choices that affect the ability of startups to exploit various types 
of founder experiences and external opportunities. In that sense, our study complements recent 
research on the complementarities in the skills between founders and their early employees 
(Müller & Murmann, 2016). 
Apart from these academic contributions, our findings have relevance for decision making in 
startups. We provide evidence of the innovation benefits of middle management for startups and 
outline conditions under which the establishment of a middle management level is most effec-
tive. In high-tech startups that have founders with rich knowledge bases and that operate in in-
dustries with many innovation opportunities, founders should critically question their own atten-
tion capacities and to what extent they can dedicate attention to innovation. Similarly, startup 
advisors, such as investors, consultants, and government agencies, should take these mechanisms 
into account. We show that the likelihood for the innovation success of a startup includes organi-
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zational design choices that will make it more likely that the startup will have suitable infor-
mation processing and monitoring capacities in place to arrive at promising R&D decisions. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
While we employ careful econometric analyses to substantiate the benefits of middle manage-
ment for startup innovation, our research is not without limitations. First, the startups in our sam-
ple have about five dependent employees on average. On the one hand, these startups may ap-
pear small for examining an organizational design choice such as the establishment of a middle 
management level. On the other hand, our qualitative interview evidence indicates that founders 
consider middle management to become salient with even fewer employees. Together with the 
rather young age of the startups in our sample (three years on average with a maximum of eight 
years), our research provides a view on the early stage in the organizational lifecycle of startups. 
Nevertheless, we suspect that an analysis based on relatively larger startups could provide inter-
esting and complementary evidence on the mechanisms invoked here. 
Second, our research investigates only one individual organizational design choice and seeks 
to isolate its effect on innovation. While we control for whether founders were replaced by pro-
fessional managers, we do not study the effects that such professionalization in combination with 
middle management may have on innovation. Moreover, the organizational structure of startups 
can be characterized by several other dimensions that may interact with the establishment of a 
middle management level. Future research could therefore consider professionalization and other 
design choices and study their interrelationships with middle management. 
Third, while our research design allows us to capture the effect of middle management 
across a number of startups and industries, smaller scale and/or qualitative studies may be better 
positioned to delineate communication and coordination patterns by which middle managers and 
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founders interact and how the relationship between the founders and rank-and-file employees 
changes. Such studies would also be particularly suited to further explore heterogeneity among 
middle managers, e.g., their job tasks, experience, or recruiting, and how these influence com-
munication and coordination with founders.  
Finally, our research also needs to acknowledge limitations to the empirical analysis. While 
both the entropy balancing and the endogenous treatment effects model approach using exclusion 
restrictions provide no indication regarding reverse causality or simultaneity, we cannot fully 
rule out that startups only hire middle managers and benefit from the introduction of middle 
management when they expect the introduction of a new product or service. Future research 
could either try to identify other exogenous shocks or attempt to establish causal evidence in 
experimental settings. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued theoretically and shown empirically that startups with a middle management 
layer have a higher likelihood to introduce product innovations than startups without middle 
management. Within our reasoning, the positive effects of middle management arise through 
improved allocation of founder attention for innovation, one of the most important strategic ob-
jectives of high-tech startups. We document the importance of middle management in the early 
stages of the organizational lifecycle and find that there are conditions under which some 
startups are better at capitalizing on this design choice: when founders are particularly well en-
dowed with technological knowledge and when there are many innovation opportunities in the 
startup’s industry. In sum, our research outlines new opportunities for theorizing and subsequent 
empirical analyses in the crucial startup phase of new high-tech ventures in which they are hard 
pressed to generate innovation before funding runs out. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
    All firms (N = 5,672) 
Variable Unit Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
  
    Product innovation (y/n) (y/n) 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Firm has middle management (y/n) (y/n) 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Innovation opportunities in NACE2 industry Count 4.87 1.01 2.03 7.37 
Number of patents before foundation Count 0.40 6.27 0.00 180.00 
Number of dependent employees Count 4.79 4.60 1.00 28.00 
R&D intensity (R&D/sales) Share 0.12 0.34 0.00 2.00 
Number of founders in team Count 1.69 0.96 1.00 9.00 
Founder with tertiary education (y/n) (y/n) 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Founder has managerial experience (y/n) (y/n) 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Founder has entrepreneurial experience (y/n) (y/n) 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Founder's years of industry experience Years 18.48 9.23 1.00 50.00 
Founder has administrative education (y/n) (y/n) 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Employees with admin. occupations (share) Share 0.16 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Employees with tertiary education (share) Share 0.26 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Equity capital in year of foundation (y/n) (y/n) 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Limited liability (y/n) (y/n) 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Firm age Years 3.04 1.76 0.08 8.00 
Riskiness of business opportunity Score 315.51 32.90 239.00 600.00 
High-technology manufacturing  (y/n) 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Technology-intensive services  (y/n) 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Software supply and consultancy  (y/n) 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Skill-intensive services  (y/n) 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Year 2007 (y/n) 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Year 2008 (y/n) 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Year 2009 (y/n) 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Year 2010 (y/n) 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Year 2011 (y/n) 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Year 2012 (y/n) 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Notes: Additional control variable: funding by KfW bank; S.D.: standard deviation; y/n: yes/no.
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Table 2. Pairwise correlations of dependent and main explanatory variables (n=5,672) 
  Variable VIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Product innovation (y/n)   1 
                (2) Firm has middle management (y/n) 1.00 0.12* 1 
               (3) Innovation opportunities in NACE2 industry 1.13 0.18* 0.07* 1 
              (4) Number of patents before foundation 1.04 0.02* -0.01 0.02 1 
             (5) Number of dependent employees 1.13 0.10* 0.27* 0.07* -0.02 1 
            (6) R&D intensity (R&D/sales) 1.29 0.26* 0.10* 0.20* 0.07* 0.03* 1 
           (7) Number of founders in team 1.16 0.09* 0.10* 0.07* 0.01 0.13* 0.10* 1 
          (8) Founder with tertiary education (y/n) 1.30 0.12* 0.06* -0.03* 0.04* 0.01 0.15* 0.27* 1 
         (9) Founder has managerial experience (y/n) 1.10 0.04* 0.06* -0.02 -0.00 0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.04* 1 
        (10) Founder has entrepreneurial experience (y/n) 1.19 0.09* 0.05* 0.11* 0.04* 0.05* 0.09* 0.23* 0.12* -0.20* 1 
       (11) Founder's years of industry experience 1.15 -0.02* 0.02 -0.03* 0.05* 0.04* -0.07* 0.01 -0.11* 0.11* 0.05* 1 
      (12) Founder has administrative education (y/n) 1.11 0.07* 0.06* -0.03* 0.01 0.03* 0.05* 0.19* 0.15* 0.04* 0.12* -0.08* 1 
     (13) Employees with admin. occupations (share) 1.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.12* 0.07* -0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.05* 0.03* 0.04* 0.05* 0.09* 1 
    (14) Employees with tertiary education (share) 1.26 0.08* 0.09* 0.04* -0.03* -0.00 0.19* 0.15* 0.33* 0.03* 0.06* -0.06* 0.03* 0.01 1 
   (15) Equity capital in year of foundation (y/n) 1.18 0.09* 0.11* 0.07* -0.00 0.12* 0.26* 0.11* 0.08* -0.01 0.06* -0.07* 0.04* 0.02 0.11* 1 
  (16) Limited liability (y/n) 1.24 0.19* 0.16* 0.22* 0.03* 0.19* 0.20* 0.31* 0.32* -0.00 0.28* -0.00 0.18* 0.03* 0.21* 0.15* 1 
 
(17) Firm age 1.20 -0.05* -0.01 -0.13* 0.01 0.12* -0.09* -0.01 -0.02* -0.03* -0.05* 0.19* -0.04* -0.09* 0.01 -0.04* -0.13* 1 
(18) Risk of business opportunity (log) 1.13 0.06* 0.04* 0.22* -0.01 -0.07* 0.11* 0.03* 0.01 -0.02 0.09* -0.09* 0.09* 0.04* 0.05* 0.03* 0.17* -0.27* 
Notes: * denotes the statistical significance of a pairwise correlation at a 10% level; y/n: yes/no; VIF: variance inflation factor.
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Table 3. First stage before and after entropy balancing 
Dependent variable: A B 
 
Full Sample Full Sample 
 unbalanced balanced 
Firm has middle management (y/n) M.E. (S.E.) M.E. (S.E.) 
 
  
 Number of patents before foundation -0.005 (0.002)** -0.008 (0.007) 
Innovation opportunities in NACE2 industry 0.015 (0.036) 0.073 (0.107) 
Number of dependent employees 0.011 (0.001)*** 0.000 (0.003) 
R&D intensity (R&D/sales) 0.020 (0.012) 0.004 (0.034) 
Number of founders in team 0.004 (0.005) 0.015 (0.015) 
Founder with tertiary education (y/n) 0.001 (0.013) -0.016 (0.040) 
Founder has managerial experience (y/n) 0.026 (0.011)** -0.011 (0.032) 
Founder has entrepreneurial experience (y/n) 0.012 (0.012) -0.008 (0.034) 
Founder's years of industry experience 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002) 
Founder has administrative education (y/n) 0.021 (0.013)* 0.017 (0.036) 
Employees with admin. occupations (share) -0.015 (0.017) 0.007 (0.052) 
Employees with tertiary education (share) 0.051 (0.016)*** -0.044 (0.049) 
Equity capital in year of foundation (y/n) 0.051 (0.019)*** 0.017 (0.053) 
Limited liability (y/n) 0.052 (0.015)*** -0.020 (0.047) 
Firm age -0.006 (0.003)** -0.012 (0.009) 
Risk of business opportunity (log) 0.052 (0.049) -0.052 (0.141) 
 
  
 Industry fixed effects (NACE3-level) Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes 
 
  
 N / Pseudo R-sq. 5672 / 0.157 5672 / 0.037 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit models. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional 
control variables in all regressions: Funding by KfW bank.
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Table 4. Main results 
Dependent variable: A B C D 
 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 




    











    
Number of patents before foundation 0.010 (0.006)* 0.025 (0.015)* 0.011 (0.006)* 0.025 (0.015)* 











    
Middle management * # patents bef. foundation   0.050 (0.029)*   0.049 (0.028)* 











    
Number of dependent employees 0.004 
(0.002)** 
0.003 (0.002)* 0.004 
(0.002)** 
0.003 (0.002)* 







(0.022)*** Number of founders in team 0.003 (0.011) 0.004 (0.010) 0.002 (0.011) 0.003 (0.010) 







(0.030)*** Founder has managerial experience (y/n) 0.016 (0.023) 0.019 (0.022) 0.017 (0.023) 0.020 (0.022) 
Founder has entrepreneurial experience (y/n) 0.002 (0.023) 0.000 (0.023) 0.003 (0.023) 0.002 (0.023) 
Founder's years of industry experience 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Founder has administrative education (y/n) 0.033 (0.026) 0.034 (0.026) 0.033 (0.026) 0.033 (0.026) 
Employees with admin. occupations (share) 0.035 (0.032) 0.031 (0.032) 0.036 (0.032) 0.032 (0.032) 







(0.035)** Equity capital in year of foundation (y/n) 0.029 (0.039) 0.027 (0.039) 0.027 (0.039) 0.026 (0.039) 







(0.034)** Firm age -0.008 (0.007) -0.008 (0.007) -0.009 (0.007) -0.008 (0.007) 




    
Industry fixed effects (NACE3-level) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 




    
N / Pseudo R-sq. 5672 / 0.14 5672 / 0.15 5672 / 0.14 5672 / 0.15 
Notes: Marginal effects from weighted probit models. Weights retrieved by entropy balancing. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Cluster-robust stand-
ard errors in parentheses. Additional control variables in all regressions: Funding by KfW ba 
